Abstract. A prominent strand within the side-channel literature is the quest for generic attack strategies: methods by which data-dependent leakage measurements can be successfully analysed with`no' a priori knowledge about the leakage characteristics. In this paper, we introduce a well-reasoned denition for what it means to have`no' a priori insight (that is, to use a power model which approximates the deviceup to nominalityby the equivalence classes associated with the target function), and use this to dene generic DPA attacks. With these denitions we are able to clarify precise conditions (on the target function) under which generic attacks succeed. Doing so, we expose a rather limited range of vulnerable target functions, so that the`myth' of the potential power of generic DPA is somewhat dispelled. We then shift focus onto linear regression-based attacks: linear regression can operate generically (as we explain) by`tting' the leakage measurements (dierently for dierent key hypotheses) to a full basis of polynomial terms in the targeted bits. Quite surprisingly, we show that even when the target function is not susceptible to generic DPA, applying some additional, non device-specic intuition to the dierent hypothesis-dependent models can in fact reveal the key. This intuition amounts to the idea that the estimated model coecients associated with the correct key hypothesis ought to be`more orderly', in some sense, provided the target function is suciently nonlinear (as is typically the case for cryptographic S-Boxes used in block ciphers). To leverage this in a practical way we apply a model building technique called stepwise regression. Thus by`emulating' a generic technique we can`magically' produce successful attacks even when generic attacks applied in a conventional mode would fail.
Introduction
Ever since Kocher et al. showed that dierential power analysis (DPA) could be successful even with very little information about the target implementation [18] , the quest to nd`generic' methods for DPA attacks has been an ongoing endeavour for the research community. Informally, the appeal of a`generic' method is the ability to successfully recover secret information even in the total absence of knowledge about the attacked device's datadependent power consumption. Recent suggestions include mutual information analysis (MIA) using an identity power model [14] , distinguishers based on the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) two-sample test statistic [31, 35] and the Cramer-von-Mises test [31] , linear regression (LR)-based methods which can be seen as a sort of on-the-y proling [10, 25] , and an innovative approach using copulas [32] . However, all existing proposals share a common shortfall when applied to injective target functions: in order to distinguish between hypotheses the attacker must, after all, have some meaningful piece of knowledge by which to partition the measurements (in the case of MIA and KS-based DPA) 3 or select the appropriate set of covariates (in the case of LR-based DPA) [32] . Such attacks can no longer be considered`generic', a description which is earned primarily by virtue of the non-reliance on a priori knowledge rather than the statistical methodology.
The focus (in the above-mentioned papers) on dening universally-applicable distinguishers indicates a confusion about the role of the distinguisher and that of the power model in what has so far been only informally dened as`generic' DPA. It also raises the fundamental question of whether truly`generic' tools exist at all. Establishing whether or not truly generic DPA attacks exist has fundamental consequences for the process of cryptographic device evaluation. The presence of generic attacks would imply that any device could potentially be attacked without any information about its internal functioning or leakage characteristics. Consequently, attacks based on proling would only be`better' in terms of eciency (number of power traces needed) not in terms of applicability. The absence of generic attacks would imply that there exist devices (leakage characteristics) which can only be evaluated soundly by performing proled attacksa practice which is not commonly undertaken at present. In the following, we tackle this important question in the practically relevant context of rst-order DPA similar to the one investigated, e.g. in [10, 14, 18, 25, 31, 35] . That is, we assume sidechannel information such that the mean of the leakage distributions is key-dependent.
Our Contribution
We approach the problem of generic attacks by revisiting Stevens'`levels of measurement' [29] to develop a theory of power models. Using this theory we rst dene what constitutes a generic power model. Next we investigate how dierent types of DPA distinguishers`t' to power models and derive a denition for a generic-compatible distinguisher accordingly. We then call the pairing of a generic-compatible distinguisher with the generic power model a rst-order generic strategy. These denitions provide a basis for making conclusive general statements about generic DPA. We show that the noninjectivity of the target function is a prerequisite for any rst-order generic strategy to succeed: in other words we prove the absence of a universally-applicable generic distinguisher in the context of rst-order DPA! Note that generic higher-order DPA (i.e. exploiting the higher-moments of a leakage distribution) can only be more dicult to design. So the rst-order context that we investigate in this work can be viewed as the most general to prove such negative conclusions regarding the possibility of generic attacks. We push our study further by observing that noninjectivity alone is still not sucient for generic success, and we hence investigate additional requirements on the target function. It is already known that there is an inverse relationship between performance against certain S-Box criteria and susceptibility to DPA [22] ; in this paper we demonstrate a sucient condition for rst-order generic success which is promoted (though not inevitably produced) by the design goal of dierential uniformity [4] . Having thus dispelled the`mythical' possibility for a universally-applicable generic distinguisher, but having gained more understanding, we make a fresh attempt at a distinguisher that operates without any a-priori assumptions about the leakage, but which produces results requiring only some non device-specic intuition for interpretation. A LR-based distinguisher is an ideal candidate; whilst it can operate from the starting point of a full basis of polynomial terms in the targeted bits (and thus, we show, qualies as a generic-compatible distinguisher) the result will not only give a key ranking but also corresponding model estimates (for each key hypothesis). Of course, in case of injective target functions, keys will be indistinguishable in the ranking, which fact is consistent with the rst half of our work and is already well-established in the literature [32] . However the resulting model estimates can also be used in the interpretation of results. The non device-specic intuition mentioned before in essence relates to the supposition that even if the leakage function is a high-degree polynomial of the target bits, it will remain`simpler' or`more orderly' for the correct key hypothesis than for an incorrect key hypothesis. This assumption can be exploited by the technique of stepwise regression, thus magically' producing successful outcomes even in scenarios where strictly generic strategies are known to fail! In practice, we observe that stepwise regression is best exploited in situations where the leakage function remains`suciently simple' compared to the target function, which we argue is frequently observed in modern computing devices. Among others and for the rst time, we perform successful key recoveries in the pathological case of Hamming weight leakages with an injective target function and generic power model, for which previ-2 ously introduced generic-compatible distinguishers systematically failed. The experiments in Section 4.5 further describe successful attacks for a range of increasingly complex leakage functions. As our investigations focus on the feasibility of generic success (irrespective of eciency), we quantify the asymptotic capabilities of LR-based distinguishers in a range of practically meaningful rst-order scenarios, targeting functions relating to DES, AES, and PRESENT block ciphers.
2 Preliminaries
Dierential power analysis
We consider a`standard DPA attack' scenario as dened in [20] , and briey explain the underlying idea as well as introduce the necessary terminology here. We assume that the power consumption T of a cryptographic device depends on some internal value (or state) F k * (X) which we call the target: a function F k * : X → Z of some part of the known plaintexta random variable X R ∈ X which is dependent on some part of the secret key k * ∈ K. Consequently, we have that T = L • F k * (X) + ε, where L : Z → R describes the data-dependent component and ε comprises the remaining power consumption which can be modeled as independent random noise (this simplifying assumption is common in the literaturesee, again, [20] ). The attacker has N power measurements corresponding to encryptions of N known plaintexts x i ∈ X , i = 1, . . . , N and wishes to recover the secret key k * . The attacker can accurately compute the internal values as they would be under each key
, k ∈ K and uses whatever information he possesses about the true leakage function L to construct a prediction model M : Z → M. DPA is motivated by the intuition that the model predictions under the correct key hypothesis should give more information about the true trace measurements than the model predictions under an incorrect key hypothesis. A distinguisher D is some function which can be applied to the measurements and the hypothesis-dependent predictions in order to quantify the correspondence between them. For a given such comparison statistic, D, the theoretic attack vector is D = {D(L • F k * (X) + ε, M • F k (X))} k∈K , and the estimated vector from a practical instantiation of the attack
are the known inputs and e = {e i } N i=1 is the observed noise). Then the attack is o-th order theoretically successful if 4 Denition 1 A practical instantiation of a standard univariate DPA attack computes, given a set of power traces T, a prediction model M , a set of inputs X, and a comparison statistic D, the distinguishing vector
A practical instantiation is said to be o-th order successful if
Measuring DPA outcomes
Metrics to compare the eciency of DPA attacks include the (o-th order) success rate and the guessing entropy of [28] dened respectively as the probability of o-th order success and the expected number of key hypotheses remaining to test after a practical attack on a given number of traces. However, in the evaluation of generic strategies, the question of asymptotic feasibility takes precedence over that of eciency. By the law of large numbers
as N → ∞ (as long as the samples are independent and 4 Note that standard DPA attacks do not include collision-based attacks [26] , which exploit information from several leakage points per observation, and do not require a power model at all.
3 identically distributed). We can therefore discuss feasibility from the perspective of the ideal distinguishing
noting that this no longer depends on the noise but only on the hypothesis-dependent power models relative to the true leakage. Indeed, averaging the trace measurements conditioned on the inputs is a popular pre-processing step in practice as it strips out irrelevant variance and reduces the dimensionality of the computations (see, for example, [1] ); it is a sound approach as long as the sidechannel information to be exploited originates in dierences between the mean values of the leakage distributions, which is the case in our standard DPA scenario. For the purposes of evaluating generic strategies, we will focus on rst-order asymptotic success, as captured by the (ideal) nearest-rival distinguishing margin (see [33, 34] 
Boolean vectorial functions
We are often interested in the special case that the key-indexed functions F k can be expressed as
2 is an (n-m) Boolean vectorial function and * denotes the key combining operator (for example, XOR). This case is particularly relevant to the study of block ciphers, which in general can be decomposed into combinations of such functions. Those components which are especially designed to introduce confusion into the system are known as S-Boxes (where`S' stands for`substitution'). Certain algebraic properties of such functions are known to be particularly important to the cryptanalytic robustness of a cipher system. We (very) briey introduce such concepts as will play a role in our later analysis; for a good basic introduction see [16] or, for a more comprehensive explanation, [7, 8] . F is ane if it can be expressed as a linear map followed by a translationthat is, if there exists a matrix
Such functions are known to be cryptanalytically vulnerable, and one of the aims in designing an S-Box is that any nonzero linear combination of the coordinate functions of F be as far away as possible from the set of all Boolean ane functions, in order to defend against linear cryptanalysis [21] . Thus the nonlinearity is dened:
F is balanced if the preimages in F of all singleton subsets of F m 2 are uniformly sized: that is, ∀y ∈ F m 2 , #{x ∈ F n 2 |F (x) = y} = 2 n−m . This property applies to many functions used in block ciphers, particularly S-Boxes [36] where any bias on the unobserved inputs is extremely undesirable. The key property providing resistance to dierential cryptanalysis as introduced by Biham and Shamir [4] is the notion of dierential uniformity. This means that the derivatives of F with respect to a ∈ F n 2 , dened as
, must be as uniform as possible. If there exists a vector a ∈ F n 2 such that D a F (x) is constant over F n 2 then a is called a linear structure of F and (as per [11] ) can be exploited by a cryptanalyst. The space {a ∈ F n 2 |D a F = cst} is the linear space of F and the larger it is, the more susceptible to cryptanalysis. 3 The`myth' of generic DPA What does it mean for an attack to be`generic'? The discussion in the literature has focused on appropriating, as distinguishers, statistics which`require few distributional assumptions'trawling the statistical literature for nonparametric, distribution-comparing procedures such as the Kullback-Leibler divergence (a.k.a. Mutual Information Analysis) [14] , the Kolmogorov-Smirnov [31, 35] and Cramer-von-Mises [31] tests, and copulas [32] . However, the emphasis on nding`distribution-free' statistics for use as distinguishers somewhat distracts from the essential dening feature of generic DPA which is that no assumptions have been made about the device 4
leakage. Clearly, the (fairly common) practice of combining such distinguishers with an informed prior model (i.e. some prior information) does not produce a generic attack. We hence also need to pay attention to what type' of power model is used in conjunction with a distinguisher; evidently we are seeking to dene what constitutes a`generic' power model. This section concentrates rst on the dierent types of model used in DPA attacks in Sect. 3.1, and which distinguishers are suitable in each instance. Based on this we subsequently give denitions for what is a generic power model, a generic-compatible distinguisher, and a generic DPA strategy in Sect. 3.2. These denitions then form the basis for a number of propositions that clarify the cases in which any generic strategy is bound to fail (we spell out necessary conditions for success and discuss further the feasibility of generic DPA).
Delineating leakage assumptions
Firstly we must distinguish between assumptions about the data-dependent leakage, as captured by the power model, and assumptions about the distribution of the noisewhich in most cases play a less visible role, but can aect how accurately or eciently certain statistics may be estimated. Figure 1 visualises this two-dimensional continuum, and indicates the suitability of some popular distinguishers as assumptions vary. Assumptions about the noise range from fully characterised distributions as exploited (e.g.) by Bayesian template attacks, down to no knowledge whatsoever, when the robustness of nonparametric statistics such as mutual information and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test may come in handy. Fortunately, the often reasonable assumption of approximate normality opens up a broad range of (semi-)parametric options, which are to be preferred as they are inherently less costly to estimate. We now consider the nature of the power model, with which this paper is primarily concerned. Previous studies have talked about`good' power models, in an arbitrary sense, and most have missed the very material distinction between dierent levels of model. As hinted towards in [2, 12] , the widely-accepted`levels of measurement' laid out in [29] present a natural framework for delineation. It is important to understand the appropriate (typespecic) notion of accuracy for a given model, and to select a compatible distinguisher; that is, one which (implicitly) interprets the model according to the correct type.
The type of power model exploited by proled attacks (e.g. Bayesian templates [9] and stochastic proling [25] ) amounts to a direct approximation of the actual power consumed by processing the data, in contribution to the overall consumption. This requirement is the most demanding possible, expressed as M ≈ L (c.f. the`ratio scale' of [29] ). The outcome of an attack will depend on how accurately the templates approximate the actual data-dependent consumption (as well as the noise distribution). The error sum-of-squares is a natural way of quantifying the appropriate notion of accuracy. 5
Less demanding is the requirement that the attacker has a power model which is a good approximation for L up to proportionality: M ≈ αL (c.f. the`interval scale' of [29] ). Pearson's correlation coecient provides a natural way to quantify accuracy and can be directly adapted for use as distinguisher [5] (a popular strategy since, as a simple, moment-based statistic, it can usually be estimated very eciently with respect to the number of trace measurements required). Less demanding again is the requirement that M approximates L up to ordinality: [29] ). Such a model could be exploited via a variant of correlation DPA using Spearman's rank correlation coecient, as proposed in [2] . And, again, the accuracy of the model can be quantied via the rank correlation itself. The least demanding requirement to place on a model is that it approximates the leakage function up to nominality only: [29] ). As ever, such a model must be paired with a statistic which interprets the values appropriately: that is to say, as arbitrary labels only. In fact, these correspond to the`partition-based' distinguishers of [27] . Typical examples include statistics which are used to compare arbitrary distributions, such as mutual information [14] and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic [31, 35] . Appropriate notions of accuracy for a nominal model are drawn from classication theory. Precision is the probability that items grouped according to the model really do belong together, whilst recall is the probability that items which belong together are identied as such (see, e.g. [19] ). 5
Dening`genericity'
We are now in a position to discuss the generic power model: what, in practice, does it mean to make no assumptions about the data-dependent leakage? Essentially, that we do no more than to assign a distinct label to each value in the range of the target function. These labels can be seen to correspond to the key-dependent equivalence classes produced by the preimages of
] ∀x ∈ X . Denition 2 The generic power model associated with key hypothesis k ∈ K is the nominal mapping to the equivalence classes induced by the key-hypothesised target function F k .
The`identity' power model emphasised in previous literature is ne for this purpose as long as it is understood that the identity mapping is simply a convenient labelling system and should be interpreted nominally only. It is immediately clear that the generic-compatible distinguishers are precisely those (described in Section 3.1 above) which interpret hypothesis-dependent predictions as an approximation up to nominality of the data-dependent leakage.
Denition 3 A distinguisher is generic-compatible if it is built from a statistic which operates on nominal scale measurements.
This provides valuable clarication on previous work such as [3] , which demonstrated successful attacks against Hamming weight leakage using correlation DPA with an`identity' power model. The authors rightly remarked that this was possible precisely because, over F 4 2 , the identity is suciently accurate as a proportional approximation of the Hamming weight to produce a successful correlation attack. Far from operating generically, the identity mapping in such a strategy is interpreted as an interval scale modelnot a perfect approximation but adequate in the specic case that L can be well-approximated by the Hamming weight. And even in this restricted case it is not, of course, invariant to permutation of the`identity' labels. Denitions 2 and 3 together give rise to a natural notion of a`generic strategy': Denition 4 A generic strategy performs a standard univariate DPA attack using the generic power model paired with a generic-compatible distinguisher.
However, as previous work on`partition-based' distinguishers (separately, e.g. [14, 32, 35] , and collectively [27] ) has consistently noted, not all (indeed, not many) scenarios are suited to a generic strategy.
Conditions for a generic strategy to succeed
All distinguishers operate by identifying the key hypotheses producing the most accurate model predictions for the actual measurements, according to the appropriate notion of accuracy for the model type (some are able to perform this comparison more eectively or from fewer trace measurements). In the generic setting each key
. Key-recovery will be possible precisely when the model produced by the correct key hypothesis is a better nominal approximation for the true leakage than those produced by any of the alternatives. We can therefore explore the conditions necessary for a successful attackindependently of any particular distinguisherby reasoning directly about the accuracy of F k * and F k , ∀k ∈ K \ {k * } as nominal approximations for L • F k * . Recall the precision and recall measures introduced in Section 3.1 (with E to denote expectation):
Trivially, the precision of the generic model under the correct hypothesis is always maximal (the leakage preimage must contain the function preimage). By contrast, the recall depends additionally on the true leakage function, so that even under the correct hypothesis we do not get perfect recall unless it happens that L is also injective. The ability of a strategy to reject an incorrect alternative requires the corresponding model to be of inferior quality; whether this is so depends on features of F k and L. An immediate and quite restrictive pre-requisite arises from the inherent nature of the generic power model: Proposition 1. No generic strategy is able to distinguish the correct key k * from an alternative hypothesis k if F k * and F k are injective.
Each hypothesis produces models of equivalent nominal accuracyno generic-compatible distinguisher can be expected to separate the candidates.
7
Indeed, all of the known generic-compatible distinguishers, from the seminal CHES '08 paper on MIA [14] to the recent copula-based method presented at Crypto '11 [32] , have individually been shown to fail whenever the composition of the target function and the power model is injective; the same observation was made for the entire class of`partition-based' distinguishers described in [27] . The authors duly noted that some restriction was required on the power model in order for these distinguishers to operate against an injective target, but left as an open question the existence (or demonstrable non-existence) of an as-yet undiscovered method which would somehow circumvent this requirement. Demonstrating that the limitation is attributable directly to the generic power model rules out this possibility. Noninjectivity is therefore a necessary condition, but not, as we next establish, a sucient one. In the general case it is rather dicult to formulate useful, concrete observations so we will henceforth narrow down to the restricted but highly relevant case that F is a balanced (n-m) function and k is introduced by key addition (as described in Section 2.3). It then becomes fairly straightforward to draw out such function characteristics as will obstruct a generic strategy.
The proof of Proposition 2 can be found in Appendix A. Part (a) arises from the fact that all key hypotheses produce indistinguishably`good' models for the leakage; the distinguishing vector produced by such an attack would be at and maximal across all hypotheses. The implication of 2(b) is that k * ⊕ a cannot be rejected if the derivative of F with respect to a is constant over the domain of F , i.e #D a F (F n 2 ) = 1. In such a case we would expect a practical attack to exhibit a ghost peak at k * ⊕ a [5] ; [22] , notes a corresponding phenomenon for correlation DPA. Part (c) can be otherwise expressed as the fact that k * ⊕ a cannot be rejected if the derivative of F with respect to a is constant over each singleton preimage of F , i.e. #D a F (F −1 [F (x)]) = 1 ∀x ∈ F n 2 . We have actually observed this property in the fourth DES S-Box, for the key-oset a = 47 (10) = 101111 (2) : in consequence, k * ⊕ 47 produces a`ghost peak' in the distinguishing vector, with a nonetheless substantial margin between these two and the remaining hypothesesa good example of an attack scenario with a low rst-order, but high second-order, success rate [28] . Our observation is consistent with, and further illuminates, past works such as [6] which recognised the unusual operation of DPA distinguishers confronted with this particular S-Box/oset combination. Thus emerges a minimal requirement for k * to be distinguished from k: Proposition 3. Suppose F is a balanced, noninjective n-m function, with k introduced by (XOR) key-addition. A necessary condition for a generic strategy to distinguish k * from k is:
If L is injective then this becomes a sucient condition. This is informally expressed as the requirement that there is at least one (singleton) preimage over which the derivative with respect to k * ⊕k is not constant. The proof follows from our reasoning in support of Proposition 2 and can be found in Appendix A along with a toy example to demonstrate that we can no longer claim suciency if L is noninjective. 8
It
so arranged as to be constant over the singleton preimages (which are of cardinality 2 n−m since F is also balanced). However, it would certainly seem to increase the chance that the condition be met for a given key-oset, as the more nely D a F partitions F n 2 , the fewer the possible renements into 2 m (balanced) parts. Therefore, among the (already restricted) class of noninjective S-Boxes we would expect ghost peaks and indistinguishable keys to be a rarityeven more so as the size of the S-Box increases. 4 The`magic' of learning
The rst part of this paper makes it clear that any generic-compatible distinguisher which returns only somè classication accuracy' for the key hypotheses will fail against injective target functions. Intuitively, then, we looking for distinguishers that compute something`more': linear regression-based methods are an immediate candidate because they can be used with a generic power model (equivalent, as we show, to providing a full basis of polynomial terms in the targeted bits)in which case the distinguishing vector of goodness-of-t values will be unable to discriminate between key hypotheses if the target is injectivebut in the process they also return the estimated power model coecients. Examining these one can readily observe that the tted models for dierent key hypotheses are dierent: we will show that the application of some simple, non device-specic intuition to these models can in fact reveal the correct key hypothesis. This process can be automated straightforwardly by using LR in a stepwise mode. We begin by introducing (standard) LR-based DPA, explaining the mechanism by which it distinguishes the correct key, and demonstrating that it is among the class of generic-compatible distinguishers. We then present the`generic-emulating' stepwise regression-inspired variant which exploits the non device-specic intuition to successfully attack injective targets even with`no' (other) prior knowledge. We nally demonstrate the (asymptotic) eectiveness of these distinguishers against well-known (injective and noninjective) S-Boxes, as the level of prior knowledge available varies from`complete' to`none'.
Introduction to linear regression-based DPA
The motivation for a linear regression-based approach begins with the observation that L : F m 2 → R can be viewed as a pseudo-Boolean vectorial function with a unique expression in numerical normal form [7] . That is to say, there exists coecients
where z i is the i th bit of z). Finding those coecients amounts to nding a power model for L in polynomial function of the coordinate functions of F . Stochastic attacks' [25] , proposed as an alternative to Bayesian template attacks, used linear regression in a proling stage to estimate those coecients from data collected on a controlled device. The authors also observedthough it was only later demonstrated [10] that the procedure could be adapted to non-proled key-recovery, in which the true leakage function is estimated`on-the-y' and recovered synchronously with the true key. Appendix B provides background on linear regression; in short, the LR-based attack uses ordinary least squares to estimate, for each k ∈ K, the parameters of the model L k * (X) + ε = α 0 + u∈U F k (X) u α u where U ⊆ F m 2 \ {0}. The distinguishing vector comprises the R 2 measure of t from each of these models:
where ρ denotes Pearson's correlation coecient). It can be viewed as a generalisation of correlation DPA, where the power model M is known a priori:
In each case, the value of k which produces the largest distinguisher value is selected as the key guess. 9
Linear regression is generic-compatible
In the way the distinguisher is most naturally presented, the attacker's prior knowledge is contained within U and it is not immediately obvious exactly what is the power model, or where it ts alongside the various types presented in Section 3.1. In fact, each u ∈ U could be seen to represent a separate power model which divides the traces into two nominal classes: {x ∈ F n 2 |F k (x) u = 1} and {x ∈ F n 2 |F k (x) u = 0}. 6 Intuitively, as long as the power consumption really does dier systematically according to the bit-interaction term represented by u, then this`approximation' has low precision but high recall under the correct key hypothesis, and loses accuracy under an incorrect hypothesis as long as the function F is such that changes to the input produce nonuniform changes to the output. Such, in fact, is the mechanism by which the original dierence-of-means distinguisher of [18] operates! So the linear regression distinguisher could be viewed as an extension of dierence-of-means DPAa means of exploiting multiple (overlapping) nominal approximations, each of low precision (and therefore weak as standalone models) but in conjunction providing a rened description of the leakage. Note that any u ∈ U which does not induce a`meaningful' partition will detract from the overall distinguishing powerhence the motivation to use any prior knowledge available to rene U. Intuitively, the generic instantiation should correspond to U = F m 2 \ {0}, which is equivalent to imposing no restrictions on the form of the leakage. But our previous reasoning about the operation of generic strategies supposed a single power model (F k , interpreted nominally) and it is hard to see how we might begin to reason about the impact of multiple power models. Fortunately, in the U = F m 2 \ {0} case only, the operation of the distinguisher can be re-framed in terms of the generic power model as dened aboveimplying that all of our prior reasoning applies.
We sketch a proof as follows: If M k is an arbitrary labeling on F k , we can always map bijectively to F m 2 to acquire an arbitrary permutation of the function outputs [7] . So the system of equations relating to an incorrect hypothesis k can be re-written in function of F k (x) by substituting in these expressions, expanding out and collecting up the terms. Note that we end up with dierent values of α u , u ∈ F m 2 whenever we reparametrise in this way: but, crucially, the terms in the equation collectively explain the measured traces equally welland it is in this sense that linear regression DPA is invariant to re-labeling and therefore can be discussed alongside other generic-compatible strategies (though it is not usually used in this wayparticularly as restrictions on U contribute to eciency gains in the estimation stage).
Fixing' generic linear regression-based DPA for injective targets? By the above argument, we expect that linear regression-based DPA with U = F m 2 \ {0} to fail for injective targets. However, we want to discuss briey how this failure manifests itself, as it gives a rst intuition regarding how that linear regression might be adapted to work even for injective targets. We focus, for clarity, on the asymptotic case (see Section 4.5). When the target function is injective, the data-dependent part of the power consumption can be expressed as a system of 2 n equations (in function of F k (x)) with 2 n unknowns. Because this system is fully-determined and consistent under any key hypothesis it always has a perfect solution, so as to produce a at distinguishing vector of maximal R 2 s. The attack can be made eective by introducing some prior information about the true form of the data dependent leakage; that is, by dropping known-to-be-redundant terms from the model equation for L so as to produce an over-determined system. By way of simple example, supposing bit contributions to be independent (a slight generalisation of a Hamming weight leakage assumption), equates to taking U = m−1 i=0 {2 i }.
As long as the discarded terms include some which do not contribute to
The point, though, is that this is no longer a`generic' strategy as it relies on some minimal insights about the device. It also assumes that the prediction`labels' are the function outputs M k = F k (in order to correctly interpret U ⊂ F m 2 \ {0}).
Exploiting non device-specic intuition
We have just argued in the previous section that if an attacker was able to make a meaningful restriction on the model terms, linear regression could be made to workthat is, to return R 2 s which allow us to distinguish between key hypotheses (producing a successful, but non-generic attack). However we now return our attention to operating linear regression generically. In this case we still have that for U = F m 2 \ {0}, the derived models give an equally good t. However, they will only give the correct expression for L in function of the output bits when k = k * : the rest of the time, they will give an expression for L • F k • F −1 k * . So, in a sense, the per-key parameter estimates contain all the information required to indicate the secret key, if only the attacker knew how to recognise the correct expression for L. Thus motivated, we examine the correct and incorrect expressions for L in the case that the target function is an injective S-Box (of size 8 bits in the case of AES, or 4 bits in the case of PRESENT) and that the true form of the leakage is the Hamming weight:
. Figure 2 shows the coecients, in the polynomial expression for L, on the covariates as produced by the true key (in black) and on those as produced under an incorrect hypothesis (in grey). The high nonlinearity of the AES, PRESENT (and DES) S-Boxes ensure that, when viewed as a polynomial in F k (X) rather than F k * (X), the leakage function L is also highly nonlinear in form. An attacker confronted with such evidence would be justied in favouring hypothesis k * over k: intuitively, it just seems more likely (especially given the known high nonlinearity of F ) that the`simpler' expression is the correct one. In order to exploit the information represented by the model estimates, we therefore need to trust this intuition (which implicitly also assumes that M k = F k but since the target function is known to us this is completely reasonable). In that sense, we have taken a step away from the generic strategybut since the intuition is not specic to any particular device it appears to be a very small step. That is, we just need to assume that the leakage function is`suciently simple' compared to the target function. This is justied for a wide range of devices manufactured in CMOS technologies, including advanced 65-nanometer processes [24] . In fact, even for protected logic styles such as introduced by Tiri and Verbauwhede [30] , it turns out that the 11 ensuring a complex (e.g. highly nonlinear) leakage function is a challenging task [23] . Besides, the results in Section 4.5 will also demonstrate that this`simplicity constraint' on the leakage function can be quite relaxed. Of course, comparing graphs is not ideal from a practical perspective, besides which the true leakage function may not always have so simple a form as to be visibly discernible: we would like to encapsulate the underlying reasoning into an automated and systematic procedure for testing hypotheses. In the next section we introduce a learning technique from data mining which uses our non device-specic intuition about`what the leakage should look like' to produce, in a wide range of leakage scenarios, asymptotically successful key recovery against injective targets even when provided with the full set of covariates U = F m 2 \ {0}. Such a strategy, whilst not generic, may reasonably be described as generic-emulating.
A stepwise regression-based distinguisher
Stepwise regression [17] is a model-building tool whereby potential explanatory variables are iteratively added and removed depending on whether they contribute sucient explanatory power to meet certain threshold criteria (see Appendix C for full details). The resulting regression model should therefore exclude`unimportant' terms whilst retaining all of the`signicant' terms. In the context of linear regression DPA this equates to testing each of the multiple binary models represented by u ∈ U separately (conditioned on current model) and then privileging those which appear most meaningful. Under a correct key hypothesis, and beginning with a full basis U = F n 2 \ {0} we would expect to obtain a`good' regression model which explains most of the variance in L, although with some minor terms absent if they do not meet our threshold criteria for statistical signicance. The example depicted in Figure 2 above justies the hope that the model produced under an incorrect hypothesis might be`less good': with the explanatory power being so much more dispersed, the contribution of any individual term decreases. These small contributions are prejudiced against in the model building process (depending on the threshold criteria) but their actual contributions are real and so, therefore, is the loss in excluding them. If the aggregate loss is sucient then the resulting R 2 will be enough reduced relative to the true key R 2 to distinguish between the two. Figure 2 also reinforces the intuition (discussed in Section 3.3) that S-Box vulnerability increases with size: the extent to which explanatory power can be dispersed among the covariates under wrong-key reparametrisation is restricted by the number of covariates, 2 m − 1. So whilst the potentially distinguishing feature can still be observed for the PRESENT S-Box it is less marked than in the case of AES, and we might expect key-recovery to be more dicult. Of course, our chosen example scenario relates to a very simple leakage function. For the attack to be successful in more complex scenarios the target function F would have to introduce sucient additional`dispersion' of the explanatory power for the model quality to be aected. Moreover, the stepwise regression algorithm is sensitive to the threshold criteria set by the user and even to the order in which the variables are introduced. The optimal p-value at which to reject or accept candidate terms will vary depending on the properties of the target function and the size of its domain (i.e. the number of equations in the system). Careful tuning may be necessary before an attack becomes successful, and there is no prior guarantee that it can be so. Such decisions implicitly form part of the`intuition' the attacker has about the true leakage. However, as previously mentioned this intuition is reasonable for a wide range of technologies. Furthermore, the next section demonstrates thateven in thè uninformed' case that U = F n 2 \ {0}the stepwise approach can succeed (asymptotically) against injective targets, regardless of the degree of the leakage function, and can improve the eciency of attacks against noninjective targets by widening the margins by which the true key is distinguished from the alternatives. 12 4.5 Asymptotic attack outcomes as knowledge on the power model varies Figure 3 shows the distinguishing margins achieved (asymptotically) by linear regression-related attacks against AES, PRESENT and DES, for leakage polynomials of increasing degree, and for diering levels of prior knowledge on the data-dependent leakage, as follows:
A perfectly characterised power model, which can be exploited straightforwardly in a correlation attack.
(Corresponds to the line labelled`Perfect model' in Figure 3) . Knowledge of the degree d of the leakage polynomial, which can be exploited via LR and stepwise LR attacks using a restricted covariate set (or initial covariate set in the case of stepwise LR) i.e., U = {u ∈ F n 2 \ {0}|HW (u) <= d}. (Labelled in Figure 3 as`Max degree LR' and`Max degree SW' respectively).
No knowledge about the leakage polynomial, i.e., U = F n 2 \ {0}, in which case we are interested in the performance of generic LR-based DPA and uniformed stepwise LR-based DPA. (Labelled in Figure 3 as Generic LR' and`Uninformed SW' respectively). As expected, the attacks exploiting a perfect characterisation perform best and are not penalised as the degree increases. LR with a known degree is decreasingly eective against injective targets (AES and PRESENT SBoxes) as enlarging the set of included covariates increases the amount of variance that can be explained under a rival hypothesisthus narrowing the distinguishing margins. It eventually fails altogether as it coincides with the generic distinguisher. However, as conjectured, stepwise linear regression does succeed, even against high degree leakage, and when combined with knowledge of the degree it is the best performing of all the linear regression-based attacks. The third panel nicely illustrates the robustness of a generic strategy against a noninjective target (namely, the rst DES S-Box), whilst emphasising the eciency gains available from both information on the degree and the use of stepwise regression. 7 This nal experiment allows us to come back on the requirement of`suciently simple' leakage function expressed in Section 4.3. Namely, Figure 2 suggests that it is the comparative`complexity' (in some sense) of
relative to L which is exploited by stepwise regression in order to recover k * . We might naturally conjecture that the approach will eventually fail as long as L is suciently nonlinear, as there would no longer be any clue by which to distinguish the true key. Somewhat surprisingly, the example attacks above do succeed even when the leakage degree is maximal, so high polynomial degree is obviously not the relevant criteria to predict attack failure, at least asymptotically. Yet, we are quite able to articially construct leakage functions against which stepwise regression does not succeed: for example, random permutations over {0, . . . , 2 m − 1}. This would indicate that the leakage functions for which the stepwise regression fails are the ones that achieve a high cryptographic nonlinearity when interpreted as functions over F m 2 at least when m is large enough. However, we leave as an open question the precise properties of L which will cause such failures. 5 Conclusion
We have dierentiated between the types of prior knowledge which an attacker might have about the device leakage, and claried the characteristics which appropriately dene a power model as`generic'. We have subsequently explored the distinguishers and scenarios which are compatible with such a construction. In particular, we have been able to conclusively demonstrate that noninjectivity of the target function is an inescapable prerequisite for such attacks to succeed, and moreover that this is not a sucient condition but must be accompanied by certain other algebraic properties. The types of properties which do enable generic key recovery can be reasonably expected of many functions used in cryptography thanks to the particular aims of S-Box design criteria, but are not inevitably produced by the criteria. Our results show formally that the gap between generic strategies and so-called proled attacks, taking advantage of prior knowledge on the leakage distribution, is not only a matter of eciency (in terms of data and trace complexity to recover a key), but also of eectiveness (that is, there exist situations in which only the latter can succeed). Hence, although the gap can be small in certain scenarios (e.g. the rst-order DPA in this paper), proled attacks such as [9] are the only way to perform sound worst-case security evaluations [28] . We have then explained and developed the theory around linear regressionbased rst-order DPA and argued for its use as an ecient but exible strategy. We have nally demonstrated how, by applying additional non device-specic intuition about the form of the leakage function, a data-mining technique known as`stepwise regression' can produce (asymptotically) successful attacks even against injective targets, and can, moreover, enhance the trace eciency of linear regression rst-order DPA with or without prior knowledge. We describe this strategy as`generic-emulating'. In this respect, an important scope of further research is to extend such generic-emulating strategies in the context of higher-order DPA and implementations protected with countermeasures. That is, can we also relax the limitations of generic-compatible distinguishers such as [13, 32] in this more challenging context, exploiting non device-specic intuitions as in this work.
Proof. (Of 2(c) ). Ultimately, k * is indistinguishable from
and Recall(F k ) = Recall(F k * ) as follows directly from the formulae). It is sucient to show that ∀x ∈ F n 2 ,
Part (b) follows trivially once we notice that, if a ∈ F n 2 is a linear structure of F , we can replace c(F (x)) in the above argument with c for some c ∈ F m 2 constant over all x. Part (a) follows from the observation that if F is ane, the linear space of F is the whole of F n 2 so that k * is indistinguishable from k = k ⊕ a for all a ∈ F n 2 \ {0} (and thus for all k ∈ K \ {k * } ⊆ F n 2 ) by the same argument. Proof. (Of Proposition 3) . That the condition is necessary follows directly from Proposition ??. Now suppose that, additionally, L is injective.
Now we look at what this does to the precision and recall of F k as a nominal model for F k * , beginning with the summands in the numerator of both expressions:
By the balancedness of F and the injectivity of L the denominator summands in the precision and recall expressions always take the value 2 n−m . In this case, then, we get that P recision(F k * ) = Recall(F k * ) = 1 whilst P recision(F k ) = Recall(F k ) < 1, so that a suciently sensitive generic-compatible distinguisher will be able to reject the hypothesis k.
It only remains to show that suciency cannot be claimed when L is noninjective, which we do with a simple illustrative example: Dene F : F 3 2 → F 2 2 and L : F 2 2 → {1, 2} such that:
L(z) = 1, z ∈ {0, 1} 2, z ∈ {2, 3}.
and F 4 (x) = F (x ⊕ 4) =
0, x ∈ {4, 7} 1, x ∈ {5, 6} 2, x ∈ {0, 1} 3, x ∈ {2, 3}.
Then (for example) F Linear regression is a statistical method for modelling the relationship between a single dependent variable Y and one or more explanatory variables Z. It operates by nding a least-squares solutionβ to the system of linear equations Y = Zβ + ε, where Y is an N -dimensional vector of measured outcomes, Z is an N -by-p matrix of p measured`covariates', β is the p-dimensional vector of unknown parameters, and ε is the noise or error term, that is, all remaining variation in Y which is not caused by Z. Once the model has been estimated, the goodness-of-t can be measured (for example) by the`coecient of determination', R 2 , which quanties the proportion of variance explained by the model:
is the total sum of squares and SS error = N i=1 (Y i − Z iβ ) 2 is the error sum of squares. In the case that Z includes a constant term (the associated parameter estimate is called the intercept), the coecient of determination is the square of the correlation coecient between the outcomes and their predicted values: R 2 = ρ(Zβ, Y ) 2 . It is appealing as an attack distinguisher by virtue of this close relationship with correlation, coupled with the fact that it requires far less knowledge about the true form of the leakage to succeed. In correlation DPA the attacker has prior knowledge of a power model M and the distinguishing vector takes the form D ρ (k) = ρ(L k * (X) + ε, M • F k (X)). In linear regression DPA the challenge is to simultaneously recover the true power model along with the correct key as follows:
Model the measured traces in function of the predicted coordinate function outputs and such higher-order interactions as you believe to be inuential. Estimate the parameters and compute the resulting R 2 under each possible key hypothesis. If the largest R 2 is produced by the predictions relating to the correct key hypothesis then the attack has succeeded. 17
The LR-based distinguishing vector is thus: .
C
Stepwise regression
The inputs to the procedure are an N × 1 vector Y containing observations of the dependent variable, p N × 1
for each of the candidate explanatory variables, a set of indices indicating terms to be included regardless of explanatory power I f ix ⊂ {1, . . . , p} and a set of indices indicating additional terms to include in the initial model I initial ⊆ {1, . . . , p} (s.t. I f ix ∩ I initial = ∅).
D Variability of measured outcomes
The asymptotic outcomes reported in Section 4.5 are based on 500 dierent leakage functions constructed to have uniformly random coecients between -10 and 10. Figure 3 displays the medians but provide a reliable indication of the behaviour over the whole sample as the variance is moderate, at least in the case of AES and DES S-Boxes. By way of illustration, Figure 4 below shows the 1 st percentiles of the measured outcomes observed. Successful outcomes against AES and DES are preserved (although diminished); there are more failure cases against the PRESENT S-Box, which we conjecture is due to its smaller size, which restricts the degree of cryptographic nonlinearity attainable. It should, of course, be noted that these attacks use xed stepwise inclusion/exclusion thresholds, and that the failure cases may respond to more sensitive tuning. 
